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Abstract
The modern global humanitarian system takes the form it does because it is underpinned by liberal world order.
Now the viability of global liberal institutions is increasingly in doubt, a backlash against humanitarianism
(and human rights) has gained momentum. I will argue that without liberal world order, global humanitarianism
as we currently understand it is impossible, confronting humanitarians with an existential choice: how might
they function in a world which doesn’t have liberal institutions at its core? The version of global humanitarianism
with which we are familiar might not survive this transition, but maybe other forms of humanitarian action will
emerge. What comes next might not meet the hopes of today’s humanitarians, however. The humanitarian
alliance with liberalism is no accident, and if the world is less liberal, its version of humanitarian action is likely to
be less liberal too. Nevertheless, humanitarianism will fare better than its humanist twin, human rights, in this
new world.
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The modern global humanitarian system takes the form
it does because it is underpinned by liberal world order,
the post-1945 successor to the imperial world of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the global
political and economic system the European empires
created. Humanitarian space, as we have come to know it
in the late twentieth century, is liberal space, even if
many of those engaged in humanitarian action would
rather not see themselves as liberals. To the extent that
there is something constitutively liberal about a majority
of humanitarian practitioners, we can define it as a
commitment to three things: the equal moral worth of
all human lives (i.e. non-discrimination on principle),
the moral priority of the claims of individuals over the
authority claims of any collective entity – from nations
to churches to classes to families – and a belief that as a
moral commitment (one that transcends any sociologi-
cal or political boundary) there is a just and legitimate
reason to intervene in any and all circumstances where
human beings suffer (even if practicality prevents it).
This is the same foundational commitment that anima-
tes human rights work. The humanist core to both of
these forms of social practice is a similar kind of belief in
the ultimate priority of moral claims made by human
beings as human beings rather than as possessors of any
markers of identity or citizenship.
What differences exist between humanitarianism and
human rights are largely sociological – the contextual
specifics of the evolution of two different forms of
social activism. I have argued elsewhere, for example,
that the ICRC is really the first human rights orga-
nisation (Hopgood, 2013: chap. 2). We can point to
different emphases – the law versus medicine, justice
and accountability versus crisis and need – but common
to both these strategies for normative action is a
commitment to the physical and mental integrity,
the existential moral dignity, of all human beings
whoever they are and whatever they have done. This
is distinctively modern, and liberal, and still something
of a heresy in manyWestern societies let alone beyond.
It is only if one shares this worldview – where the
suffering of strangers is a matter of concern, and
a legitimate ground for principled intervention, for
everyone – that humanitarianism and human rights
enjoy full legitimacy. They are both morally grounded
by the same ends, ends that have thrived under US-led
liberal order for four decades (reaching their zenith
from 1991 to 2011).
During this time, both humanitarianism and human
rights have provided a seemingly non-political (or
perhaps ‘political’ not ‘Political’) outlet for religious
and secular activists, many from the left disillusioned
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with the truncated horizons of the New Left and resigned
to the triumph, for a generation or two, of welfare
capitalism (Meiksins Wood, 1995). Before this, global
humanitarianism had been a largely religious exercise, an
extension of Christian ministry (Barnett, 2011), while
human rights barely registered on the world stage
(Moyn, 2010). From the 1970s on, the humanist
international became a place where disillusioned rebels
could continue to work, albeit in a new idiom, for those
who suffered. They ceased working to any great extent on
their own societies, especially as reformists of the centre
left and right (Clinton, Blair) came to dominate the
party-political scene after Thatcher and Reagan
embedded the neoliberal revolution of the 1980s. After
the ColdWar, in other words, the liberal world order was
a fact of life. In Margaret Thatcher’s immortal words,
‘there is no alternative’.
The consequences of this focus on private enterprise,
mobile money, weakened unions, reduced state welfare
and regulation and lower taxes are all too visible today
in areas like wealth inequality and looming environ-
mental disasters. Domestically, the liberal social contract
is coming apart in many Western states as the coalition
of those who have not benefited from the decades of
wealth accumulation after 1979 turns to populist politi-
cians and looks for scapegoats, with experts, immigrants
and Muslims seen as prime targets. The commitment to
liberal institutions that create limits to the scope of
political competition – rights, the rule of law, freedom of
the press – and to the basic level of respect due to all
persons, be they citizens or refugees, is eroding. Both the
right and the left have come to see in these liberal
mechanisms barriers to the realisation of their most
desired preferences (more aggressive chauvinism, more
effective redistribution). Politics at the national level in
theWest has been shocked back into life after decades of
malaise. The insistent questions are no longer techno-
cratic but substantive, with attitudes to ‘the other’ a
pivotal part of these conversations globally. In 2018,
Freedom House recorded its twelfth consecutive year
of decline in freedom worldwide, with 71 countries
registering a reduction in political rights and civil
liberties (Freedom House, 2018).
All of which puts the viability of global liberal
institutions increasingly in doubt. This idea of a
protected place where, regardless of one’s identity
(ethnicity, nationality, religion, gender, sexuality, but
also whether or not one is a dissident), one’s basic
rights are secure is constitutively liberal. As fewer and
fewer governments, and more and more people, view
the existence of such a sanctuary within society as
fanciful, illegitimate and even hostile to wider norms
and interests, attacks on civilians, IDPs and refugees
and aid workers have grown. Fears of scarcity, feelings
of injustice, lack of recognition and enervating insecur-
ity have all taken their toll.
The room for humanism has reduced as a result. We
can see this in the backlash against human rights and
the erosion of humanitarian space. Indeed, in what
follows, I will suggest that without liberal world order,
global humanitarianism as we currently understand it is
impossible. Governments of rising powers, increasingly
important in a world whose rules they did not write,
allege that human rights and humanitarianism represent
the soft-power version of Western modernity, another
vector for the transmission of liberal-capitalist values
and interests that threatens their hold on national power
and resources. China, with its muscular conception of
sovereignty and its no-questions-asked relationship with
other authoritarian states, leads the way. These non-
Western states can hardly be blamed for their scepticism
given the degree to which humanitarians often attend
crises that themajorWestern powers have been complicit
in creating (think Vietnam, Congo, Cambodia, Iraq,
Syria, to name just a few).
All of which confronts humanitarians with an exis-
tential choice. Howmight they function in a world which
doesn’t have liberal institutions at its core? Human rights
activists struggle given they rely on broad international
agreement – treaties, customary law, courts, Western
foreign-policy support – to do their work. Is humani-
tarianism any different? The version of global humani-
tarianism with which we are familiar might not survive
this transition, but maybe other forms of humanitarian
action will emerge, or thrive where they already exist,
especially once the canopy is opened up because the eco-
system’s tallest trees have been felled. Of course, what
comes next might not meet the hopes of today’s
humanitarians, especially because the degree to which
it can be truly a global humanitarian system must be
doubted if no international consensus can be forged to
support it. The humanitarian alliance with liberalism is
no accident, and if the world is less liberal, its version of
humanitarian action is likely to be less liberal too.
Modern Humanism and Liberal World
Order
Could anyone working in good faith in the field of global
humanitarianism today argue that only some lives should
be saved, and only some suffering curtailed, because one
class of persons is more important than another? It was
possible to make this claim openly once, when one’s
fellow nationals and co-religionists were the target of
‘humanitarian’ actions, but it hasn’t been permissible to
make it legitimately in the global humanitarian system
for at least eighty years.
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Consider, for example, the canonical statement of
modern humanitarianism, the seven fundamental prin-
ciples of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, indepen-
dence, voluntary service, unity and universality. Under
‘humanity’, the Red Cross talks of ‘assistance without
discrimination’ and of its purpose as being ‘to protect life
and health and to ensure respect for the human being’.
The ‘impartiality’ requirement says: ‘It [the Red Cross]
makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious
beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavours to relieve
the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their
needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of
distress’ (ICRC, 2016). Other humanitarian codes of
conduct contain similar principles. Discrimination in
humanitarianism is restricted to triage – where the most
effective intervention can be made on the basis solely
of need.
Humanitarians might, of course, be less than assi-
duously moral in treating those whose lives they are
supposed to be saving, as we have seen with recent
#MeToo scandals (BBC, 2018a). Also, their commitment
to aid might be superficial and based around a narrow
idea of life as basic subsistence, for example, rather than
of the quality of the lives of those they have saved. But
few modern humanitarians are likely to make a moral
claim that they will save only the lives of those who
look or think like them, a common occurrence in the
nineteenth century. All beneficiaries have prima facie
equal value.
But humanitarians’ reliance on liberal world order
goes much deeper than this core liberal principle about
the equal worth of all human lives. Liberal space is
constitutive of the international political system as a
whole. Consider the second Red Cross principle, ‘neu-
trality’: ‘In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of
all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or
engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial,
religious or ideological nature’ (ICRC, 2016). This liberal
space exists above and beyond political space, a space
where, regardless of one’s identity, nationality, ethnicity,
religion, gender, sexuality or citizenship, one retains a set
of private rights and personal freedoms that no collective
authority can interfere with legitimately. In Judith
Shklar’s words, liberalism’s dominant aim is ‘to secure
the political conditions that are necessary for the exercise
of personal freedom’ (Shklar, 1989: 21). Or as Michael
Sandel argues, ‘whether egalitarian or libertarian, rights-
based liberalism begins with the claim that we are
separate, individual persons, each with our own aims,
interests, and conceptions of the good, and seeks a
framework of rights that will enable us to realize our
capacity as free moral agents, consistent with a similar
liberty for others’ (Sandel, 1984: 4). What this means in
relation to the liberal state is clear. As John Gray puts it:
‘The sine qua non of the liberal state in all its varieties is
that governmental power and authority be limited by a
system of constitutional rules and practices in which
individual liberty and the equality of persons under the
rule of law are respected’ (Gray, 1986: 75).1
In the realm of world politics, we know that these
principles are mainly honoured in the breach. Most
vulnerable is the idea that liberal space is somehow
apolitical. To take an obvious example, no self-respecting
liberal state could pass a law that required its citizens to
practise the same religion or to curb their freedom to
dissent against the government. Private freedoms are
beyond the reach of public policy (with obvious com-
plexities, e.g. around hate speech and blasphemy). The
problem here is simply put. In the words of Brian Barry
(1990: 8):
If the principle of neutrality were itself neutral
between different belief systems and conceptions of
the good, we would be home and dry. But that is not
so. The principle of neutrality does indeed put them
all on the same footing, but to accept that this is how
things ought to be organized it is necessary to have
an outlook that is, in broad terms, liberal.
In effect: ‘What I have suggested is that there is no way in
which non-liberals can be sold the principle of neutrality
without first injecting a large dose of liberalism into their
outlook’ (Barry, 1990: 11). When faced with Trump, Xi
Jinping, Orban, Erdogan, Putin, Assad, Duterte, non-
liberals all, how can the argument for neutrality be
successful? They see opponents not as legitimate
competitors protected by a set of institutional rules
that limit the scope of conflict but as threats to be
eliminated. Chantal Mouffe differentiates ‘the political’
from ‘politics’: the political is the sphere of existential
conflict over the nature of the state where the most basic
institutions of the system itself are fought over (Mouffe,
2005: chap. 2). This is the realm of Carl Schmitt, where
opposition must be eradicated not just defeated. Once
the structure of ‘the political’ is settled, through blood
and iron, everyday politics can take place safe in the
knowledge that it cannot change the fundamental political
structures that underwrite it.
The principle of neutrality targets ‘the political’ sphere.
It aims to set a concrete limit on what states can
legitimately do to their own citizens, most importantly
in terms of ending their lives and destroying their
potential to challenge state power. Neutrality asserts that
killing one’s opponents in this way, simply because they
oppose you, is forbidden and, crucially, that all those
playing the game are supposed to agree it is forbidden.
Not killing your opponents is one of the rules. However
much this has been ignored in practice, by almost all6
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states at one time or another, the fact remains that for
liberal world order this has been a foundational rule.
Without a consensus on respect in principle for each
individual human life and for that person’s own interests
and projects, the appeals of humanitarians become
mere arguments, opinions, preferences, not obligations
anchored in fundamental and shared moral rules.
Those who challenge legitimate authority can now be
painted as anti-social elements who fragment society and
threaten political stability, who underminemoral probity
and who are a danger to the community, which has an
overwhelming collective interest in stopping them. And
they can be stopped even with the use of lethal violence
(Presidents Assad in Syria and Duterte in the Philippines
being extreme examples). It is not humanitarians who
created this ‘neutral’ space but liberal-capitalist states.
And the scale of private and state violence in our world
shows us that it is far from a universally held view that all
lives have equal worth (think of the Black Lives Matter
campaign, for example, to tackle the widespread killing
of African-Americans by the US police). But without
this principle, humanitarianism ceases to be a demand
for rights, justice and the observance of the law, and
becomes an appeal to pity, charity, mercy and sentiment.
We are teetering on the edge of this precipice now.
Lest this argument looks like a paean to liberalism,
liberalism itself has, of course, as much of a dark
side as other ideologies (as does humanitarianism: see
Kennedy, 2005). It is just that liberalism’s dark side
bars in principle (again, not necessarily in practice) the
deliberate killing and cruel treatment of people except
under the most extreme and carefully circumscribed
circumstances. To take obvious examples, liberalism
could tolerate suffering and death from poverty and
it could use science and technology to mould and
manipulate human behaviour without the use of
brute physical violence. But liberals, true to the logic
of their liberalism, baulk at overt and explicit killing
and suppression of dissent. In other words, they have a
problem with violence and a penchant for achieving
their ends by other means (in the main, by using the
law). It is characteristic of our era that we have tried
to tell a story about human moral progress in the last
two hundred years that drives a wedge between norms
of legitimate care and norms of legitimate violence,
but the reality is the liberal era manifested suffering,
cruelty, killing and deprivation on a huge scale alongside
extraordinary productivity and progress. This juggernaut
of modernity opened up societies, constructed a field
for exploration and experiment, delivered copious
casualties, human brutality and cruelty and so brought
with it, as the accompaniment to liberal-capitalist
progress, an array of ministers who would tend to the
souls, the bodies and the aspirations of the casualties of
the attempt to create one world in the image of liberal
freedom. Resistance was often futile or at least hugely
costly (think of Vietnam). Wars were waged for decades
to ensure no part of the system could harbour an
economic model or an ideological commitment that was
antithetical to the liberal capitalist consensus or refuse to
open up its resources to the needs of the international
market (Robinson, 1996).
Take, for example, Henri Dunant, the patron saint of
modern humanitarianism, who was actually at Solferino
to beg for Emperor Louis Napoleon’s help in saving his
colonial investments. We can look at the use by German
forces in the 1870 Franco-Prussian war of the Red Cross
as a bombing target, or the contrast between The Hague
Conventions and the use of poison gas during World
War I, or prior to that the creation of a concentration
camp system by the British in South Africa. Indeed,
we can go back to the famines the British at worst
engineered, and at best tolerated, in India, killing
millions of people. Or the Germans and the Herero, or
the Belgians and the Congo, or the British andMauMau,
or the French in Algeria. As the Americans joined the
fray postWorldWar II (after Nazi Germany’s attempt to
exterminate the Jews, and after the US dropped two
atomic bombs on civilians without warning), we can fast-
forward to the use of nerve agents in Vietnam, the mass
bombing of civilians in Cambodia, the giving of a green
light to the government in East Pakistan to commit
genocide in what is now Bangladesh or the political
support the US gave to Pinochet and the Khmer Rouge.
We can go back to the time when Hitler used US race
laws as a model for the Third Reich (Whitman, 2017), or
to slavery and genocide against Native Americans, or
forward again to the use of mass incarceration by liberals
in the US more recently (Murakawa, 2014). We can add
torture by the British government in Aden and Northern
Ireland andmore recently, as wewell know, US torture in
the ‘war on terror’. These are just the examples that come
to mind. There are many more.
Yet, having said all of that, it remains a core liberal
belief that, broadly speaking, things are moving in the
right direction morally. That things are getting better,
whatever better might mean. It must be right that in
our era, even if we date that back two hundred years,
there has been a decline in public and state-sanctioned
physical cruelty and in certain forms of killing (Pinker,
2012). Humanitarianism and human rights take the core
normative principle of the liberal order – that all human
lives are sacrosanct – and use it to ground transnational
practices of intervention. It is this existing global rule that
is being challenged. The ground gained by so called
‘illiberal democracy’ is prodigious, not merely in terms of
the number of countries where illiberal politics is alive and
thriving, many of which are in the West (the US, much
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of the EU, the UK) but in terms of the creeping legitimacy
that attends right-wing solutions to ongoing social and
political problems. This is nowhere truer than in themajor
new power in the international system, China, where a
version of state-controlled capitalism co-exists alongside a
principled rejection of liberalism.
The redistribution of power at the international level
(from one dominant state since the 1980s, the US, to two
now) stems from the rise of China. A kind of bipolarity –
a system dominated by two centres of power – has
been re-established in global politics. As in other areas –
trade, environment, security, public health, transport –
the return to bipolarity has had a major impact. The
implications of this are simple but profound: rules and
norms that conflict in some waywith the preferences of the
Chinese government will no longer necessarily be enforce-
able at the global level. We know what this looks like
because it is how the US has behaved for much of the last
eighty to a hundred years. Now we have two major
powers, much like we did during the Cold War (which is
not to say we are entering another Cold War, the mutual
dependence of the US and Chinese economies making
that unlikely). As China’s influence, its diplomacy, its
money and its power flow into all areas of the
international political system, so it will be harder and
harder to persuade either indifferent or reluctant states
that they have no choice in the longer run but to follow
the existing norms and rules.
The Coming World
The transformation of global rules and norms creates
several possible scenarios. One is a renegotiation between
the two dominant powers. A second is the rise of an
alternative set of rules to those with which we have been
familiar since 1945 – new rules that reassert more firmly
the primacy of sovereignty against the claims of rights, for
example. And another is that there will be a void – an
interregnum, a vacuum – where no one really knows
whether the rules will be enforced anymore (to the extent
that they were ever really enforced). This means states at
best have to hedge their bets (trying to retain the goodwill
of both China and the US) and at worst can simply flout
those rules with impunity.
It is far too early to talk about a renegotiated set of
rules, but it is clear that the result of such a new
dispensation – the forging of a set of arrangements that
both sides can live with and benefit from – will by
definition be further from the preferences of the US, a
unipolar and even hegemonic power for much of the last
three decades and the primary liberal power in the
international system. In terms of alternative rules, the
‘sovereignty trumps rights’ discourse has never been
absent. It has been very powerful in the case of the
US itself – see US ambivalence about many human
rights treaties and the ICC, for example. But between the
end of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the intervention in
Libya in 2011, the demands of both rights advocates and
those arguing for humanitarian intervention made
their biggest impact of the entire post-1945 era. Faced
with atrocity, crisis, danger and threat, sovereignty could
be challenged, whether through R2P, the demands of the
ICC, universal jurisdiction, human rights, the Genocide
Convention, crimes against humanity and so on. What
made this possible was the lack of a state capable of
challenging the US, which was explicitly committed in
principle to economic and political liberalism (even as it
found ways to exempt itself from the impact of those
rules). And even where intervention did not occur, and
the US explicitly rejected norms around rights and
intervention, the space opened for a small army of
humanitarian and human rights organisations to actively
involve themselves in crises and complex emergencies
worldwide under the sometimes explicit, often implicit
protection of Western hegemony.
This all came to an endwith the intervention in Libya of
2011. On the face of it, getting China and Russia to abstain
from using their veto on the security council must have
seemed like a diplomatic coup. But in reality, this was a
trigger for greater Chinese assertiveness. The blocking of
effective action on Syria at the security council, including
preventing a referral of Assad to the ICC, was the result. It
is a long time since Kosovo in 1999, the high point of the
post-Cold War humanitarian international, when the
Western-led coalition broke international law but justified
it by retrospectively arguing their actions were ‘illegal but
legitimate’. Imagine China making the same argument
about its treatment of the Uighurs, as many as one million
of whom, it is said, now languish in re-education camps
(Cumming-Bruce, 2018).
The third possibility, that we face a normative void,
is perhaps more worrying, exemplified by the brutality
with which Presidents Putin and Assad, along with
the Saudi government, have torn up IHL by bombing
hospitals in Syria and Yemen. Indeed, the sense that the
US has been far from transparent about why it bombed a
hospital in Afghanistan in 2015 has fuelled arguments
of hypocrisy that might have mattered less when the
US had no challengers but matters a great deal now
China’s rise has created a space into which a resurgent
Russia has stepped. These are structural shifts in the
sense that even the most liberal government in the US
would find it hard to throw its weight around when
China is always available – in South East Asia, in Africa,
in Central Asia – to provide financing and diplomatic
support with few strings attached (and to threaten forms
of retaliation when such inducements fail). The rise of
Trump can even be explained as a reaction to a sense of8
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gathering national decline, hence his campaign slogan:
‘Make America Great Again’.
Why does the normative void matter? In the past,
many states abided by international law as much for fear
of punishment (sanctions, diplomatic isolation, denial of
favourable terms of trade) as because of a commitment to
the moral vision the law embodied. We can see this is
now missing in the case of human rights and, given the
liberal core that underlies humanitarian (i.e. neutral)
space, in humanitarian action as well. Human rights and
humanitarianism lack the logic that enforces most
effective international norms, that we will not kill or
torture your citizens if you do not kill or torture ours.
That is, the principle of reciprocity.2 A classic example is
prisoner protection. If you torture enemy combatants
you have captured, your enemy will do the same to
your POWs. The same logic goes for using chemical
weapons and even nuclear weapons. This is how mutual
deterrence works.
This fits fully with the demands of sovereignty.
Agreements that work meet the interests of both parties.
This depends, of course, on the existence of a reasonable
parity of capacity between states. Your enemy will not be
afraid of your retaliation if it has nuclear weapons and
you do not, as Iran, Israel, North Korea and the US all
understand. This need for parity is always an issue,
classically captured by the relative stability of mutually
assured destruction. But where China, Russia and the
US are concerned, it doesn’t hold. Without the
leverage provided by the US, whether through threats
or incentives, China and Russia only need to agree to
international rules when they choose to. Who could
compel them to do otherwise (unless one of them aligns
with the US)? And so, where cooperation in the coming
world at the inter-state level on matters of mutual
interest is feasible, China and the US will need to see it
as in their mutual interest. To protect its people,
investments and products, China will need to deploy
power over significant distances, giving rise to costly
strategic interests and a case for cooperation (Ikenberry,
2012). But China need never again feel forced to follow
rules or norms which it does not support. It now has a
choice. What consequence in terms of its international
reputation or power would follow from it refusing to
support the global humanitarian system, instead, for
example, deploying its own forces and resources to assist
those in states sympathetic to its foreign-policy goals?
This strikes at the heart of the failure of R2P and the
ICC. Humanitarian action and human rights rely on a
disparity of power, not on reciprocity, because they
ultimately require the capacity to act against sovereignty
if necessary – that is, against the wishes of the sitting
government. The belief after 1991 that the possibility
now existed permanently for sovereignty to become
conditional on international normative approval lies
at the root of much of the hubris of the last two
decades (despite the fact that anchoring it all was the US,
which refused steadfastly to qualify its sovereignty).
Sovereignty is the foundational norm of ‘the political’ in
the international system, and to demand sovereignty is
overruled to achieve a normative end is a high-risk and
usually doomed activity unless two conditions hold: one,
a great power is willing to back the demand materially
(usually because it has some interest in the outcome);
and, two, no other major power opposes the action
because it has a vital interest at stake. To demand
intervention, to open up access, to call for trials all
presume that there is, somewhere in the system, the
capacity for pressure to be exerted in the name of some
degree of accountability. Until 2011, this meant what do
the Americans think? They could act or block action.
Now China (and under Chinese cover, Russia) have this
kind of veto power too.
This is obvious in Syria. Assad and Putin have no
interest in allowing humanitarians to work, because they
are intent on destroying the opposition and consolidat-
ing their power. There is no neutrality without prior
agreement on some kind of liberal space, however slim –
Brian Barry’s point earlier. Powerful states and their
agencies make trade, aid, investment, security support,
diplomatic access, travel and much more besides depen-
dent on whether or not allies and neutrals comply with
their foreign-policy interests (Hafner-Burton, 2013).
In the case of the West, humanitarian action and
human rights demands have been features of these
foreign-policy demands. In the case of China, neither has
been. And so concerted action in times of crisis will only
take place because it threatens Chinese interests,
promises China some kind of reputational benefit or is
a case to which China is indifferent (like Mali, for
instance). And China’s allies – from Sudan to Zimbabwe
to Egypt to the Philippines to Kazakhstan to North
Korea – can rest easier in the knowledge that China
will not use human rights norms or humanitarian
intervention against them.
We are not talking about the end of humanitarianism.
China has shown itself willing to commit money and
expert personnel to assist with natural disasters (the
Philippines, Nepal), especially when there is a strategic
pay-off. An urge to help, and the public diplomacy that
goes with it, will see China join other major states in
making the right noises and doing the right thing (even
if, like most other governments, follow-through is poor).
This is particularly the case when it comes to natural
disasters. The difficulty comes with politics. Intervening
in situations of conflict and atrocity will need to meet a
different calculus.Wemight see this as a positive thing. It
might take humanitarians back to their roots: keep
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people alive, leave, and let the fighting continue, the
government reassert control, the rebels continue to try to
topple the established rulers. A stripped-back solidarity-
based humanitarian ethos has been recommended
recently by some (DuBois, 2018). We might give war a
chance, as Edward Luttwak put it (Luttwak, 1999; we
might prefer to say give politics a chance). What will
be different is the presumption that states should
let international humanitarian and aid agencies into
situations of civil war or possible mass atrocity.
Presidents Assad and Putin have tested this norm and
found they can break it with impunity. Indeed, it seems
clear now that both will be key players in any long-term
solution to the conflict in Syria. They have, in effect,
begun the process of creating a new norm: you can
regain legitimacy if you have major power protection and
you win.
There are other major changes in the issues that
affect the international system – industrial and energy
pollution and its environmental impact, including the
scarcity of resources like water, and the mass displace-
ments that are likely to come with climate change. Then
there is rampant inequality and the consequent rise of
populism, the revival of this kind of national chauvinism
being likely to hamper international cooperation. Allied
to this is the revival of various forms of religious and
ideological fanaticism across the belief spectrum, creating
intolerance, violence and instability. The impact of tech-
nology is also not necessarily benign, allowing easy
communication, yes, but creating a megaphone for preju-
dice, propaganda, targeted character attacks and the
erosion of trust. But these changes, while important, will
not have the same far-reaching consequences as the change
in the distribution of power in the system as a whole.
The three options outlined above – renegotiated global
norms, sectarian norms and a norm void – are not
mutually exclusive, and we might pass through them in
phases or move between them in a less linear fashion.
These changes are just the beginning of a world of
uncertainty and ambiguity, where no one is entirely sure
what the rules are (and thus what the punishments might
be for breaking them) and where states must proceed by
trial and error. Strengthened sovereignty and a weaken-
ing of liberal norms will, however, necessitate humani-
tarians and human rights workers dealing with
governments who can say no to them like never before.
This risks exacerbating the humanitarian suffering of
people caught up in or active in conflicts, and threatens a
worsening human rights outlook for those who would
challenge state authority (both of which are illustrated by
the unending misery of the people of Syria).
But it also raises an important question about the
international system as a whole. If liberal order has
provided the right environment for humanitarian action
focused on individual suffering, presumably the ubiquity
and longevity of that action suggests it has also fulfilled
some sort of function for the international system in
reverse. In the section that follows, I argue that the social
function of humanitarianism has been as a kind of
ideological legitimation of liberalism, both as a symbol of
its moral necessity and as cover for its many absences
and failures. Ironically, it is here that we begin to see how
human rights and humanitarianism diverge as social
practices and thus have different futures. In the final
section, I’ll expand on this, suggesting that major powers
will always need some means to legitimate rule and
excuse failure at the global level, and that some form of
care for the casualties of the wider social order will be
necessary. Human rights, by contrast, are incapable of
playing this role because they cannot be reconceptualised
and constructed on any other basis than liberal order.
Humanitarian Performance
To ask what function a form of social practice performs
is not to ask what it means to those who perform it. The
meanings of humanitarianism to humanitarians can be
multiple, but do any of these answers explain why we
currently have a humanitarian system that spans the
globe, ministers to millions of people every day, receives
billions of dollars in income and is a major player in
every crisis? More than this, it is clear that the scale of
human suffering remains prodigious and that for as
much good as they do, humanitarians frequently do little
in terms of a net reduction in suffering andmisery (think
Haiti, Syria, Somalia, DRC, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, South
Sudan). Much suffering – private violence, civil and gang
wars, state predation, poverty, insecurity – is untouched
by humanitarian intervention of any kind, yet this is
everyday reality for billions of people.
One function of the entire humanitarian enterprise
might be to obscure root causes and allow those who,
en masse, might be able to bring pressure to bear to
relieve suffering (mobilised citizens in the West) to
think that something is being done so they need not act
nor feel guilty. Donations are given instrumentally, to
preventmigration, and as the wages of sin, a palliative for
guilt and shame. Humanitarian actions might help
prevent armies of the dispossessed from flooding the
shores of the wealthy by keeping those who suffer
‘over there’. Whatever the reasons, the fact that inter-
national and local NGOs are heroically working to
deal with the consequences of disaster and conflict
allows the deeper reasons for inequities of power and
money to go unchallenged. It performs the role of alibi,
in other words, for the political actors whose foreign-
policy choices lie behind many of our major inter-
national crises.10
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For example, for powerful states who had to navigate
the end of the Cold War and the renewed process of
decolonisation to which it led, the ‘complex emergencies’
of the 1990s created policy problems with which they
have often allowed humanitarians to deal. This created a
kind of ‘plausible deniability’ consistent with neoliberal
principles that stress privatisation and the shrinking of
public bureaucracy. This provides a convenient answer
to the question of what is being done and a simple
way to maintain an arms-length relationship between
engagement in messy political problems and denial (give
money, award projects, do not do it yourself, blame
others for failure). UN peacekeeping operations have
been used in a similar way, as have international criminal
tribunals. All suggest that something is ‘being done’, but
in most cases these processes do little to stem the tide of
ordinary human suffering. Think of the treatment of
refugees trying to enter Europe today.
A second function of humanitarianism is in reinfor-
cing the sense that order, and non-violence, is the natural
equilibrium in international affairs. The breakdown in
order, the chaos and the dying and killing that comes
through disaster and conflict must be halted as soon
as possible, and the path to redemption – to, as far as
possible, re-establishing normal service – comes through
showing all of those looking on that the catastrophe has
been contained. It is a kind of quarantine effect, whereby
what frightens observers is the idea of uncontrolled,
ongoing, unpredictable suffering. Humanitarians arrive
to create a moment of ‘new normal’ where the flow has
been stemmed, the hole plugged. The Ebola response is
an example of this – the vast cost in life and suffering
and the everyday life experiences of West Africans in
the communities affected are all but invisible now
because the breach was contained. What normal does
is obscure and disguise the reality of structural violence:
that ‘normal’ society is full of need, suffering, violence
(including structural and institutional violence) and
the everyday suppression of multiple human freedoms,
and that inequality of life risks is an endemic feature of
the lives of poorer people. The ongoing private and
state violence that takes place every day is rendered
invisible through global shows of compassion and caring
to combat the most visible examples of breakdown in
public order. TheWorld Humanitarian Summit in 2015,
long on rhetoric, short on action (and held in Turkey, of
all places), was almost a teaching case of this need to
show that, despite numerous abject failings, the humani-
tarian enterprise as a whole was not yet finished. As
Stephen O’Brien, under-secretary general for humani-
tarian affairs at the time, put it:
The Summit is a once-in-a-generation opportunity
to re-inspire and reignite our common humanity;
and to enact an agenda for progress to save lives,
prevent and alleviate suffering, protect our fellow
women and men, and enable human dignity for all
people who are affected by natural disasters and
conflicts.
(United Nations, 2015)
None of this is going to happen and we all know it. This
sense of the show going on, of the need to ‘perform’ hope,
possibility, redemption, is palpable in these monumental
efforts by the ‘humanitarian international’ to present
itself to the world. O’Brien called humanitarian norms
‘the last protection against barbarity’.
The performance of hope speaks powerfully to the
sacredness that is at the core of the whole humanist
enterprise. This is the spiritual heart of the cosmopoli-
tan ethos, the constructivist efforts to give the lie to
Huntington’s allegation that ‘international elites’ are
‘dead souls’ because they lack a nationalist connection
and have forgotten ‘the mystic chords of memory’
(Huntington, 2004).3 Humans need some sense of spirit,
belief, meaning, a vision of the future. To do anything
at all we must believe it is going to make a difference.
Humanitarianism is one response to Max Weber’s claim
that the iron cage of rationality would rob moderns of
their enchantment (Hopgood, 2016). Whatever you do,
you cannot suggest that the train has stopped moving or
people will lose heart, and faith, and will look around for
other things to do with their time and money. Keep on
believing it will work if we only try harder, spend more,
revolutionise our thinking, learn lessons from past
failures. Humanitarianism is the recognition, even in the
midst of great suffering, that there is hope, a light in the
darkness (Hopgood, 2006). This hope is often fleeting for
specific victims of conflict, famine and natural disasters,
but it feeds the idea of hope in a bigger sense: that we can
do better, become better, forge a world without cruelty
and suffering. Through the last century and a half, a global
set of government and UN agencies, international NGOs,
churches and social activism efforts has combined to
create a global humanitarian (what shall we call it: a
regime, an industry, amovement?) complex. It has a spark
of humanity at its core, the preservation of hope for us all.
Third, humanitarianism also serves as a vector for the
deeper norms of liberalism, spreading what Barry called
‘the liberal outlook’: secular humanitarians are modern
missionaries even in their very being, carrying with them
modernity in terms of ideas about gender, sexuality,
freedom of choice and more. This is entirely consistent
with the emphasis on the consuming individual at the
core of the modern market-based global economy.
For the majority of humanitarians, a set of rights-based
freedoms are ‘normal’. Along with shelter, food
and medicine come ways of living that challenge
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long-established social and cultural norms as well as
government restrictions on dissent and opposition.
Humanitarians are, unwittingly or not, avatars of
modernity. This fact lies at the root of scepticism about
the ‘neutrality’ of humanitarian NGOs, agencies and
their personnel. They are in essence committed, as I have
argued, to the same principles as human rights workers
which are viewed bymany states and inmany societies as
anything but neutral.
In these senses, the social function of humanitarianism
– not why people do it but why it continues tomatter that
such a thing as humanitarianism exists – has little to do
with any positive impact it might have. It serves other,
equally important purposes. Its functionality is to be
measured on a different scale than impact on the lives of
the needy. But this performance has stopped working as
part of the general collapse of liberal world order. The
counter-evidence about its failure is too extensive and
the ongoing damage to its moral reputation profound.
We have stark reality contrasted with idealistic vision.
Humanitarians need the hope – how else would they get
up and go to work? – but they experience the reality, too.
Why has this dissonance not broken humanitarianism
apart? For a variety of familiar reasons. One is insti-
tutional inertia – there are a lot of organisations and
individual careers riding on the continuation of the
humanitarian project. A second is professionalisation,
the careers people have built as humanitarian profes-
sionals, not well-meaning amateurs – careers with status,
credentials, salaries and pensions. Third is the endless
supply of those who would wish to make a difference,
whose sense of what they are getting themselves into is
misconceived from the start. Overall, humanitarianism
and human rights create a legitimacy for the current
global dispensation, a way to respond to difficult
questions and feelings about the casualties of world
order, a way to feel righteous and hopeful despite the
reality, a way to preserve the illusion that we are
making progress (Bradol, 2004).
Conclusion: The Future
To act in sovereign spaces, you need access to those
spaces. This is true of any hegemonic governance regime.
All empires open up spaces for traders, proselytisers,
missionaries, settlers, travellers, adventurers, migrants
and others to enter political space. The new world order
will open some spaces and close others. But this is a
question about the overall environment that humanitar-
ians face. It says less about the framework of norms and
rules itself. What will happen to IHL or the various
humanitarian codes of conduct in this new world? More
importantly, how much will humanitarian NGOs invest
in supporting the existing rules, especially IHL, and how
much in negotiating with major new players a different,
and potentially more implementable, set of rules? The
IHL question is pivotal. Have Russia, Syria and Saudi
Arabia broken the rules or begun to establish new ones –
that opponents you identify as an existential threat
to your power do not enjoy the protections of humani-
tarian law? Why will all governments not welcome
this enhancement of their room for manoeuvre? The
reciprocity of state–state relations is absent when you
are trying to defeat an insurgency and more generally
deter opposition. Can humanitarians tolerate a new
dispensation of this sort that formally recognises the
unprotected status of enemy combatants and political
dissidents?
One answer to this is to argue that the global
humanitarian system is adapting. The talk of more
sustained partnership between local and global NGOs is
an example of this. But we need to be wary of thinking
that there has been any real letting go. The DRC even
boycotted its own donor conference in irritation at the
way it was being treated (BBC, 2018b). A second answer
is to consider the ways in which humanitarianism might
move away from its liberal moorings. Here, its capacity
to adapt comes from its ability to offer comfort in any
situation – the torture chamber, the scaffold, the death
camp – without any prospect of making a fundamental
difference to the longer-term prospects of those who
suffer. Consider a real-world MSF example: should you
provide condoms to a child soldier so that when he rapes
women in the villages he pillages they won’t get HIV
(Lepora and Goodin, 2015)? What is the human rights
answer to this question? Don’t rape, of course. Okay,
now given that rape is likely to occur regardless, what’s
the answer? In the here and now, humanitarians have
one, and must have one, whereas human rights advocates
do not. They must remain silent, restate the law or
compromise their principles, which for them looks like
the legitimation of a crime. Isn’t the humane thing
to do to hand over the condoms? But are you then
complicit in a human rights abuse?
This points to an important distinction – a political
not a foundational distinction – between humanitarian-
ism and human rights. It is difficult to see what value
human rights have for states as a whole at the systemic
level (beyond those narrow areas of reciprocity). They
can be useful as a foreign-policy tool to apply soft-power
pressure to other governments, but all states find them
more or less irksome when they demand accountabi-
lity or behavioural change. Human rights contribute
little that is obvious to the smooth functioning of
the international system as a whole (assuming that they
rarely deter atrocity and forced displacement – and
indeed, as this whole article argues, are increasingly
less likely to do so). But humanitarianism does have12
Jo
ur
na
lo
f
H
um
an
ita
ria
n
A
ffa
irs
(2
01
9)
1/
1
Downloaded from manchesteropenhive.com at 08/09/2019 11:17:18AM
via free access
system-wide functions, as we have seen – to provide a
mechanism to prevent the failures of the system as a
whole endangering the broad consensus necessary for
it to continue, and to mop up some of the mess when
great-power policies end in failure and collapse.
There is, then, a third possibility – humanitarianisms.
A kind of normative pluralism. Of course, historically
there have been many different ways to deal with those
who suffer. This might well be the world we are entering
again. But how much diversity can be tolerated? Could a
humanitarian practice that argued it would help only
‘people like us’ and leave to suffer and die ‘people like
them’ be judged genuinely humanitarian? If your answer
is no, surely you are arguing for limits to the malleability
of humanitarian social practice that aren’t hardwired
into the idea? But discriminatory humanitarianism is
surely conceivable? You might not offer ‘them’ the
same care as you offer your own, but you might
keep them barely alive (by openly offering them out-
of-date medicines, for example – not equal treatment,
but it might help). Must treating everyone similarly, or
according to need, be a requirement of all forms of
humanitarianism? If so, doesn’t that commit us to the
most basic rule of the liberal order – non-discrimination?
If any form of humanitarianism to which one is prepared
to append the label must recognise this feature, then you
are committed to the liberal-world-order version of
humanitarian action.My assumption is that this is where
most humanitarians are – on the liberal side of the
argument.
But the politics of humanitarian assistance in the new
world will intensify choices between a more expansive,
human rights-based model and the giving of alms and a
bed for the night (Rieff, 2002). If that is the case, who is to
say that religious belief is not a more adequate form
of succour than a commitment to liberal modernity
and the solidarity of humanitarian strangers? Can these
humanitarians work with governments that use violence
as standard to deter dissent and punish opposition and
discriminate on principle against those they see as
deviant in terms of gender and sexuality? Governments
that suppress freedom of expression and persecute
minorities? Or who routinely abuse refugees? Reform
risks opening up the entire humanitarian enterprise to
these sorts of pragmatic compromise with unpredictable
results. There is, of course, significant pragmatism
already, but the power of IHL in particular is codification
in black-letter law where interpretations, but not first
principles, are the only variable. If it is hard to imagine
any concession on these principles, the danger is that
cynicism festers in the gap between great power practice
and established rules. But as any negotiator knows,
amending an existing agreement is far easier than trying
to get consensus on a whole new document.
Perhaps the most fundamental question for humani-
tarians in this rapidly changing order is: who are we
now? What is our mission, our ethical foundation, our
cause? The structural forces that shape the world of pain
and its palliatives are well beyond the scope of any vision
of wholesale change. We can no longer be utopians, at
least for a while. Moderating the borders of suffering
might be all that is feasible. If humanitariansmust believe
that something can be done, then let them concentrate
on the here and now, in rendering help to this person,
for a brief moment, or for the fortunate few on whom
the spotlight alights. Let them be active in their own
societies where there is plenty of need. Let them be
politically engaged ‘at home’. Aren’t humanitarianism’s
colonial origins sort of obvious when we think
about the decline of the liberal order? For most people –
the countless millions who will never receive aid – the
reality of human suffering must be faced with even less
hope for fundamental change than has marked the last
fifty years. The purpose, the ethical core, the mission,
the motivations – all of these seem to me to be in play
now that the assumptions of liberal-capitalism are open
to question. What is humanitarianism for in such a
world? That is the question that needs answering now.
Let’s say yes to a million acts of kindness wherever,
whenever, every day. But a global multi-billion-dollar
regime that spans the globe? That’s something else
entirely. If the answer is that it is no longer fit for
purpose, then it might be time to start again, and this
time not in Geneva.
Notes
1 There is, of course, a wide array of definitions of liberalism
and a wide variety of examples of liberal states in action.
As Duncan Bell observes: ‘Self-declared liberals have
supported extensive welfare states and their abolition; the
imperial civilizing mission and its passionate denunci-
ation; the necessity of social justice and its outright
rejection; the perpetuation of the sovereign state and
its transcendence; massive global redistribution of wealth
and the radical inequalities of the existing order’ (Bell,
2014: 683).
2 Norms can also be supported by the idea that a world of
rules and norms has benefits for everybody – predictability,
peaceful resolution of conflict, a last line of protection – and
that even if a state disagrees with one or other actual
norms, having a system of norms is valuable enough to
keep them in the fold. But these norms do not have to be
liberal. In the time of slavery, for example, international
norms about the slave trade and aspects of empire were
agreed by major states.
3 UK prime minister Theresa May recently called global elites
citizens not of the world but of ‘nowhere’ (Merrick, 2017).
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